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Abstract. The degree of trust that an agent has for another is the strength of
the agent’s belief that the other will enact its commitments without variation.
A strong sense of trust may be sufficient justification for one agent to sign a
contract with another when all that matters is the possibility of variation between
commitment and enactment. In non-trivial contracts the agents’ information is
typically asymmetric with each agent knowing more about its ability to vary its
actions within its contractual constraints than the other. To enable an agent to deal
with the asymmetry of information we propose two models. First, a relationship
model that describes what one agent knows about another, including the belief
that it has in the reliability of that information. Second an integrity model where
integrity is the strength of an agent’s belief that the other will not take advantage
of its information asymmetries when enacting its commitments.
1 Introduction
The term trust is used in the sense of “certainty based on past experience”, and is com-
monly used particularly as the strength of belief that an agent has in another’s desire
to enact its commitments without variation. The literature on trust is enormous. The
seminal paper [1] describes two approaches to trust: first, as a belief that another agent
will do what it says it will, or will reciprocate for common good, and second, as con-
straints on the behaviour of agents to conform to trustworthy behaviour. Trust is used
here in line with the first approach where trust is something that is learned and evolves,
although this does not mean that we view the second as less important [2]. Reputation
is the opinion (more technically, a social evaluation) of a group about something —
in a social environment. Reputation [3] feeds into trust. [4] presents a comprehensive
categorisation of trust research: policy-based, reputation-based, and trust in information
resources. [5] presents an interesting taxonomy of trust models in terms of nine types of
trust models. [6] describes a powerful model that integrates interaction and role-based
trust with witness and certified reputation.
Information asymmetry between contractually-bound agents has been studied exten-
sively, and reached prominence with the award of the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics
to George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz “for their analyses of mar-
kets with asymmetric information.” Contract theory tackles information asymmetry by
C. Huemer and T. Setzer (Eds.): EC-Web 2011, LNBIP 85, pp. 246–257, 2011.
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invoking the unrealistic concept of a complete contract that specifies the consequences
of every possible state of the world [7]. In real situations, agents accept that contracts
are incomplete and rely on their contractual partner to ‘do the right thing’. In other
words, an agent relies on them to act with integrity, where integrity is the strength of
belief that the other will not take advantage of its information asymmetries when enact-
ing his commitments. An agent will be (economically) motivated to act with integrity
when it prefers to develop an on-going (business) relationship with another agent rather
than taking full advantage of each opportunity as it occurs. An agent who exhibits this
latter behaviour may need to continually seek new trading partners if past partners are
not motivated to trade again. It is proposed that the development of a sense of integrity
comes hand-in-hand with the development of (business) relationships. In particular, the
estimation of integrity is predicated on the existence of a model of relationships.
This paper is concerned with tools to manage variations in agent behaviour that may
take advantage of information asymmetries whilst being trustworthy, i.e. within its con-
tractual commitments. Two tools are proposed. First, relationships described in Sec-
tion 2, and an associated relationship model described in Section 3. Second, an integrity
model described in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 ‘Relationships’ between Agents
There is evidence from psychological studies that humans seek a balance in their ne-
gotiation relationships. The classical view [8] is that people perceive resource alloca-
tions as being distributively fair (i.e. well balanced) if they are proportional to inputs
or contributions (i.e. equitable). However, more recent studies [9,10] show that humans
follow a richer set of norms of distributive justice depending on their intimacy level:
equity, equality, and need. Equity being the allocation proportional to the effort (e.g. the
profit of a company goes to the stock holders proportional to their investment), equality
being the allocation in equal amounts (e.g. two friends eat the same amount of a cake
cooked by one of them), and need being the allocation proportional to the need for the
resource (e.g. in case of food scarcity, a mother gives all food to her baby).
We believe that the perception of balance in dialogues (in negotiation or otherwise)
is grounded on social relationships, and that every dimension of an interaction between
humans can be correlated to the social closeness, or intimacy, between the parties in-
volved. The more intimacy the more the need norm is used, and the less intimacy the
more the equity norm is used. This might be part of our social evolution. There is am-
ple evidence that when human societies evolved from a hunter-gatherer structure1 to a
shelter-based one2 the probability of survival increased when food was scarce.
In this context, we can clearly see that, for instance, families exchange not only
goods but also information and knowledge based on need, and that few families would
consider their relationships as being unbalanced, and thus unfair, when there is a strong
1 In its purest form, individuals in these societies collect food and consume it when and where
it is found. This is a pure equity sharing of the resources, the gain is proportional to the effort.
2 In these societies there are family units, around a shelter, that represent the basic food sharing
structure. Usually, food is accumulated at the shelter for future use. Then the food intake
depends more on the need of the members.
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asymmetry in the exchanges (a mother explaining everything to her children, or buying
toys, and then does not expect reciprocity). In the case of partners there is some evidence
[11] that the allocations of goods and burdens (i.e. positive and negative utilities) are
perceived as fair, or in balance, based on equity for burdens and equality for goods.
The perceived balance in a negotiation dialogue allows negotiators to infer infor-
mation about their opponent, about its stance, and to compare their relationships with
all negotiators. For instance, if we perceive that every time we request information it
is provided, and that no significant questions are returned, or no complaints about not
receiving information are given, then that probably means that our opponent perceives
our social relationship to be very close. Alternatively, we can detect what issues are
causing a burden to our opponent by observing an imbalance in their information or
utilitarian utterances on that issue.
A relationship between two agents is somehow encapsulated in their history that is
a complete record of their interactions. This potentially large amount of information is
usually summarised by agents into various models. For example, the majority of agents
construct a world model and a trust model. This paper is concerned with two models that
are designed to assist an agent to deal with pervasive information asymmetry founded
on the observation that each agent knows more about its own commitments and its
intended enactments than any other agent. These two models are a relationship model
described in Section 3 and an integrity model described in Section 4.
This Section describes the LOGIC illocutionary framework for classifying argumen-
tative interactions. This framework was first described in [12] where it was used to help
agents to prepare for a negotiation in the prelude stage of an interaction3. This paper
generalises that framework and uses it to define one of the two dimensions of the rela-
tionship model described in Section 3, the second dimension is provided by the structure
of the ontology4. The five LOGIC categories for information are quite general:
– Legitimacy contains information that may be part of, relevant to or in justification
of contracts that have been signed.
– Options contains information about contracts that an agent may be prepared to sign.
– Goals contains information about the objectives of the agents.
– Independence contains information about the agent’s outside options — i.e. the set
of agents that are capable of satisfying each of the agent’s needs.
– Commitments contains information about the commitments that an agent has.
and are used here to categorise all incoming communication that feeds into the agent’s
relationship model. As we will see this categorisation is not a one-to-one mapping and
some illocutions fall into multiple categories. These categories are designed to pro-
vide a model of the agents’ information that is relevant to their relationships, and are
3 The five stages of an interaction dialogue are described in Section 4.
4 All that we require of the ontology is that it has a partial order ≤ defined by the is-a hierarchy,
and a distance measure between concepts such as: δ(c1, c2) = e−κ1l · eκ2h−e−κ2h
eκ2h+e−κ2h which is
described in [13] where l is the shortest path between the concepts, h is the depth of the deepest
concept subsuming both concepts, and κ1 and κ2 are parameters scaling the contribution of
shortest path length and depth respectively.
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not intended to be a universal categorising framework for all utterances. The LOGIC
framework for managing communication is illustrated in Figure 1. A simplified formal
model relates the LOGIC framework to the BDI model:
– L = {B(α, ϕ)}, that is a set of beliefs.
– O = {Plan(〈α1,Do(p1)〉, . . . , 〈αn,Do(pn)〉}, that is a set of joint plans.
– G = {D(α, ϕ)}, that is a set of desires.
– I = {Can(α,Do(p))}, that is a set of capabilities.
– C = {I(α,Do(p))} ∪ {Commit(α,Do(p))}, that is a set of commitments and
intentions.
This paper is written from the point of view of an agent α is in a multiagent sys-
tem with a finite number of other agents B = {β1, β2, . . . }, and a finite number of
information providing agents Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . } that provide the context for all events
in the system — Θt denotes the state of these agents at time t. α observes the actions
of another agent β in the context Θt. The only thing that α ‘knows for certain’ is its
history of past communication that is retains in the repository Htα. Each utterance in
the history contains: an illocutionary statement, the sending agent, the receiving agent,
the time that the utterance was sent or received.
Observations are of little value unless they can be verified. α may not posses a com-
prehensive range of reliable sensory input devices. Sensory inadequacy is dealt with
invoking an institution agent, ξ, that truthfully, accurately and promptly reports what
it sees. So if β commits to delivering twelve sardines at 6:00pm, or states that “it will
rain tomorrow” and is committed to the truth of that prediction, then α will eventually
be in a position to verify those commitments when ξ advises what actually occurs. ξ is
simply a convenient abstraction to deal with the problem of sensory inadequacy of soft-
ware agents. As we will see below, agent α qualifies all utterances received, including
offers, information, arguments, with an epistemic probability representing α’s belief in
their veracity. ξ is the only agent that α believes is always truthful.
All communication is recorded in α’s history Htα that in time may contain a large
amount of data. The majority of agent architectures include models that summarise the
contents ofHt; for example, a world model and a trust model. In this paper we describe
two models, a relationship model and an integrity model that are specifically designed
to assist an agent to manage information asymmetries. To build the relationship model
we will use the LOGIC framework to categorise the information in utterances received.
That is, α requires a categorising function v : U → P({L,O,G,I,C}) where U is the set
of utterances. The power set, P({L,O,G,I,C}, is required as some utterances belong to
multiple categories. For example, “I will not pay more for wine than the price that John
charges” is categorised as both Option and Independence.
3 The Relationship ModelRtαβ
All of α’s models are summaries of its history Htα. The relationship model that α has
of β consists of four component models. First, α’s intimacy model of β’s private infor-
mation describes how much α knows about β, Itαβ . Second, α’s reliability model of how
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reliable is the information summarised in Itαβ , Rtαβ . Third, α’s reflection model of β’s
model of α’s private information, J tαβ . Fourth, a balance model, Btαβ , that measures
the difference in the rate of growth of Itαβ and J tαβ .
The remainder of this section details how these four models are calculated. This is
achieved by extracting data from the process used to update the agent’s world model
Mt — if an agent maintains the currency of their world model then the marginal cost
of building these four models is low. The description given employs the machinery to
update the world model in our information-based agents [14]. However it can be adapted
to the machinery used by any agent that represents uncertainty in its world model using
probability distributions, in which case Mt = {Xi}i where Xi are random variables.
In addition to the world model and the models described in this paper an agent may
construct other models such as a trust model and an honour model [15].
The idea of intimacy and balance is that intimacy summarises the degree of close-
ness, and balance is degree of fairness. Informally, intimacy measures how much one
agent knows about another agent’s private information, and balance measures the extent
to which information revelation between the agents is ‘fair’. The intimacy and balance
models are structured using the LOGIC illocutionary framework and the ontology O5.
For example, the communication Accept(β, α, δ) meaning that agent β accepts agent
α’s previously offered deal δ is classified as an Option, and Inform(β, α, info) meaning
that agent β informs α about info and commits to the truth of it is classified as Legit-
imacy. The balance model of α’s relationship with β, Btαβ , is the element by element
numeric difference of ddtI
t
αβ and ddtJ
t
αβ across the structure {L,O,G,I,C} × O.
3.1 The Components Itαβ , Rtαβ and Jtαβ
The intimacy of α’s relationship with β, Itαβ , is the amount that α knows about β’s
private information and is represented as real numeric values over {L,O,G,I,C} × O.
Suppose α receives utterance u from β and that the LOGIC category f ∈ v(u), where v
is the categorising function described above. For any concept c ∈ O, define Δ(u, c) =
maxc′∈u δ(c′, c) where δ is a semantic distance function such as that described in Foot-
note 4. Denote the value of Itαβ in position (f, c) ∈ {L,O,G,I,C}×O by Itαβ(f,c) then:
Itαβ(f,c) = ρ× It−1αβ(f,c) + (1− ρ)× It(u)×Δ(u, c) (1)
for any c, where ρ is the discount rate, and It(u) is Shannon information gain as given
by Equation 7. α’s estimate of β’s intimacy on α, J tαβ , is constructed similarly by
assuming that β’s reasoning apparatus mirrors α’s.
The reliability model for utterance u is updated subsequent to the receipt of u when
the institution agent ξ advises α that u′ was observed instead of u that was expected.
Denote the value of Rtαβ in position (f, c) by Rtαβ(f,c) then:
Rtαβ(f,c) = ρ×Rt−1αβ(f,c) + (1 − ρ)× Rt(u)|u′ ×Δ(u, c) (2)
for any c, where ρ is the discount rate, and Rt(u)|u′ is given by Equation 9.
5 Only a subset of the ontology is required. The idea is simply to capture “How much has Carles
told me about wine”, or “how much do it know about his commitments (possibly with other
agents) concerning cheese”.
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Fig. 1. The LOGIC framework for categorising information in an agent’s relationship model
Utterances are represented in the world modelMtα as probability distributions, (Xi),
in first-order probabilistic logic L. For example, in a simple multi-issue contract nego-
tiation α may estimate Pt(acc(β, α, δ)), the probability that β would accept contract
δ, by observing β’s responses. The distribution Pt(acc(β, α, δ)) ∈ Mtα is classified as
an Option in LOGIC. Using shorthand notation, if β sends the message Oﬀer(δ1) then
α may derive the constraint: Kacc(β,α,δ)(Oﬀer(δ1)) = {Pt(acc(β, α, δ1)) = 1}, and
if this is a counter offer to a former offer of α’s, δ0, then: Kacc(β,α,δ)(Oﬀer(δ1)) =
{Pt(acc(β, α, δ0)) = 0}. In the not-atypical special case of multi-issue bargaining
where the agents’ preferences over the individual issues only are known and are com-
plementary to each other’s, maximum entropy reasoning can be applied to estimate the
probability that any multi-issue δ will be acceptable to β by enumerating the possible
worlds that represent β’s “limit of acceptability” [14]. As another example, the predicate
canDo(α, β, ν) meaning β is able to satisfy α’s need ν — this predicate is classified as
Independence in LOGIC.
UpdatingMtα is complicated the need to take the integrity of utterances received into
account — it would certainly be foolish for α to believe that every utterance received
from β was correct — whereas all utterances received from the institution agent ξ are
assumed to be correct. The procedure for doing this, and for attaching an a priori belief
to utterances (see Equation 10), is summarised in Section 3.3.
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3.2 Estimating the information in an utterance: It(u)
Mtα is a set of random variables, Mt = {Xi, . . . , Xn} each representing an aspect
of the world that α is interested in. In the absence of in-coming messages the integrity
of Mt decays. α may have background knowledge concerning the expected integrity
as t → ∞. Such background knowledge is represented as a decay limit distribution.
One possibility is to assume that the decay limit distribution has maximum entropy
whilst being consistent with observations. Given a distribution, P(Xi), and a decay
limit distribution D(Xi), P(Xi) decays by:
P
t+1(Xi) = Δi(D(Xi),Pt(Xi)) (3)
where Δi is the decay function for the Xi satisfying the property that limt→∞ Pt(Xi) =
D(Xi). For example, Δi could be linear: Pt+1(Xi) = (1− νi)×D(Xi)+ νi×Pt(Xi),
where νi < 1 is the decay rate for the i’th distribution. Either the decay function or the
decay limit distribution could also be a function of time: Δti and Dt(Xi).
The following procedure updates Mt for all utterances u ∈ U . Suppose that α re-
ceives a message u from agent β at time t. Suppose that this message states “If I were
you then something is so” with probability z, and suppose that α attaches an epis-
temic belief Rtαβ(u) to u — a method for estimating Rt(u) is given below. Each of
α’s active plans, s, contains constructors for a set of distributions {Xi} ∈ Mt to-
gether with associated update functions6, Ks(·), such that KXis (u) is a set of linear
constraints on the posterior distribution for Xi. Denote the prior distribution Pt(Xi) by
p, and let p(u) be the distribution with minimum relative entropy7 with respect to p:
p(u) = argminr
∑
j rj log
rj
pj
that satisfies the constraints KXis (u). Then let q(u) be
the distribution:
q(u) = Rtαβ(u)× p(u) + (1 − Rtαβ(u))× p (4)
and then let:
P
t(Xi(u)) =
{
q(u) if q(u) is “more interesting” than p
p otherwise
(5)
A general measure of whether q(u) is more interesting than p is: K(q(u)‖D(Xi)) >
K(p‖D(Xi)), where K(x‖y) =
∑
j xj ln
xj
yj
is the Kullback-Leibler distance between
two probability distributions x and y.
Finally merging Equation 5 and Equation 3 we obtain the method for updating a
distribution Xi on receipt of a message u:
P
t+1(Xi) = Δi(D(Xi),Pt(Xi(u))) (6)
6 A sample update function for the distribution Pt(acc(β, α, δ)) is given above.
7 Given a probability distribution q, the minimum relative entropy distribution p = (p1, . . . , pI)
subject to a set of n linear constraints g = {gj(p) = aj ·p−cj = 0}, j = 1, . . . , n (that must
include the constraint
∑
i pi−1 = 0) is: p = argminr
∑
j rj log
rj
qj
. This may be calculated
by introducing Lagrange multipliers λ: L(p,λ) =
∑
j pj log
pj
qj
+ λ · g. Minimising L,
{ ∂L
∂λj
= gj(p) = 0}, j = 1, . . . , n is the set of given constraints g, and a solution to ∂L∂pi =
0, i = 1, . . . , I leads eventually to p. Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference
that is convenient when the data is sparse [16] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning [17].
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This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two probabilities: first, the probabil-
ity z in the utterance u, and second the belief Rtαβ(u) that α attached to u. the Shannon
information gain in Xi is:
I
tXi = Ht(Xi)−Ht−1(Xi)
and if the distributions in Mt are independent then the Shannon information gain for
Mt following the receipt of utterance u is:
I
t(u) =
∑
Xi
I
tXi (7)
3.3 Estimating the Reliability of an Utterance: Rt(u)
R
t
αβ(u) is an epistemic probability that takes account of α’s personal caution. An em-
pirical estimate of Rtαβ(u) may be obtained by measuring the ‘difference’ between
commitment and observation. Suppose that u is received from agent β at time t and is
verified by the institution agent, ξ, as u′ at some later time t′. Denote the prior Pt(Xi)
by p. Let p(u) be the posterior minimum relative entropy distribution subject to the con-
straints KXis (u), and let p(u′) be that distribution subject to KXis (u′). We now estimate
what Rtαβ(u) should have been in the light of knowing now, at time t′, that u should
have been u′.
The idea of Equation 4, is that Rtαβ(u) should be such that, on average across Mt,
q(u) will predict p(u′) — no matter whether or not u was used to update the distribution
for Xi, as determined by the condition in Equation 5 at time u. The observed reliability
for u and distribution Xi, RXit(u)|u′, on the basis of the verification of u with u′, is
the value of k that minimises:
RXi
t(u)|u′ = argmin
k
K(k · p(u) + (1− k) · p ‖ p(u′))
where K is the Kullback-Leibler distance. The predicted information in u with respect
to Xi is:
IXi
t(u) = Ht(Xi)−Ht(Xi(u)) (8)
that is the reduction in uncertainty in Xi where H(·) is Shannon entropy. Equation 8
takes account of the value of RXit(u).
If X(u) is the set of distributions in Mt that u affects, then the observed reliability
of β on the basis of the verification of u with u′ is:
R
t(u)|u′ = 1|X(u)|
∑
i
RXi
t(u)|u′ (9)
For any concept c ∈ O, Rt(c) is α’s estimate of the reliability of information from β
concerning c. In the absence of incoming communications the integrity of this estimate
will decay in time by: Rt(c) = χ × Rt−1(c) for decay constant χ < 1 and close to 1.
On receipt of communication u concerning c that is subsequently verified as u′:
R
t(c) = μ× Rt−1(c) + (1− μ)× Rt(u)|u′ (10)
where μ is the learning rate, that estimates the reliability of β’s advice on any concept
c. This completes the estimation of It(u) and Rt(u).
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4 The Integrity Model Itαβ
Agents interact through various forms of dialogues. This paper is concerned with com-
mitment dialogues that contain at least one commitment, where a commitment may be
to the truth of a statement or may be a contractual commitment. We assume that all
commitment dialogues take place in some or all of the following five stages:
1. the prelude during which agents prepare for the interaction
2. the negotiation that may lead to
3. signing a contract
4. the enactment of the commitments in the contract
5. the appraisal of the complete interaction process that is made when the goods or
services acquired by enactment of the contract have been consumed
The term trust is commonly used to refer to the enactment of commitments [4], and is
evaluated at the completion of the enactment step in a commitment dialogue. ‘Integrity’
is distinct from trust, and is concerned with the appraisal of the dialogue including
the behaviour of partner agents in commitment dialogues. For example, when ordering
a bottle of wine, the merchant is trustworthy if the bottle is delivered as contractually
specified, and the merchant will have acted with integrity if the wine is in good condition
when it is consumed — possibly at a considerably later time.
The integrity of agent β is the strength of α’s belief that β will enact its contractual
commitments so as to take account of α’s interests rather than executing the contract
selfishly ‘to the letter’. For example, “I haven’t got the strawberries you ordered because
yesterday’s hail storm is likely to have bruised the fruit”. Integrity is measured on a
finite, fuzzy scale containing values such as ‘perfect’ and ‘terrible’. For some dialogues
the appraisal stage may take place a considerable time after the enactment stage; for
example, “Carles advised me to buy the Mercedes and I after three years I am still
delighted with it” that implicitly rates the quality of Carles’ advice. This time delay is
the reason that some business relationships necessarily take time to develop.
The integrity model is required to do the following. Given a particular need ν and
the prevailing contextual information Θt, Itαβ aims to estimate the integrity of each
agent in satisfying ν on the basis of the past commitment dialogues recorded in Htα.
From the set of commitment dialogues in Htα with agent β, we first form Ctαβ that
contains: an abstraction of the need that triggered the dialogue, the prevailing contextual
information and the resulting evaluation of the dialogue. The abstraction of the need ν
is to a chosen level using the≤ relation in the ontology — see Footnote 4. For example,
Htα may contain a dialogue involving buying potatoes from β in which case Ctαβ could
contain a record involving ‘root vegetables’ together with the contextual information
that prevailed at that time, and the evaluation.
Itαβ aims to form beliefs on the evaluation of future commitment dialogues with
agent β based on Ctαβ by treating the evaluations as values of the dependent variable.
This can be interpreted as a pattern mining exercise from the information in Ctαβ to find
the ‘best’ hypothesis that describes Ctαβ . One neat way to perform this induction is the
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minimum description length principle [18] that is founded on the minimisation of the
cost of communicating a body of knowledge from one agent to another that thus has a
fundamental affinity with distributed autonomous systems:
Itαβ  argmin
M
(L(M) + L(Ctαβ | M)) (11)
where L(M) is the length of the shortest encoding of M , and L(Ctαβ | M) is the length
of the shortest encoding of Ctαβ given M . This definition is as neat as it is computation-
ally expensive — it divides Ctαβ into that which may be generalised and that which may
not.
The definition of Itαβ in Equation 11 appears problematic for three reasons. First,
if M can be any Turing computable model the definition is not computable, second
there should be a language for representing M , and third the meaning of ‘the length
of the shortest encoding’ is not clear. The second and third reason have been resolved
[18]. The first, computability problem can be solved by restricting the models to some
specific class. If the models are restricted to Bayesian decision graphs over finite spaces
then Equation 11 is computable [19].
The model does not take time into account. In some applications old observations
may be poorer indicators that recent ones, but this is not always so. To allow for varying
strength of observations with time we construct instead C∗tαβ that is the same as Ctαβ
except each appraisal, x, is replaced by a random variable X over appraisal space.
These probability distributions are constructed by: λ×X + (1− λ)×DX where DX
is the decay limit distribution8 for X — and X is a distribution with a ‘1’ indicating
the position of the appraisal and 0’s elsewhere. This fine-grained approach gives control
over the integrity decay of each observation.
Despite its elegance, Equation 11 is computationally expensive and we now describe
methods for evaluating integrity for given ν and Θt for various β’s. We represent the
relationship between need ν, context Θt and appraisal a using conditional probabili-
ties, Pt′αβ(a|ν,Θt). If ν is a need, Θt the context that prevailed at the time t commit-
ments were made, and a the resulting subsequent appraisal performed at time t′ then
P
t′
αβ(a|ν,Θt) is the probability that a will be observed at time t′ given that β had been
selected to service need ν in context Θt at time t.
Any attempt to estimate Pt′αβ(a|ν,Θt) has to deal with the unbounded variation in
context Θt. We assume that there is a finite set of ‘essentially different’ contexts Γ
and then estimate Ptαβ(a|ν, γ) for γ ∈ Γ . Suppose that Ptαβ(ai|ν, γ) is observed where
ai ∈ A the finite appraisal space. Then α attaches an epistemic strength d ∈ [0, 1]
to this observation that is the probability that the same appraisal would be observed if
the process was repeated for the same ν and γ. Then Pt+1αβ (a|ν, γ) is the distribution
with minimum relative entropy to the prior Ptαβ(a|ν, γ) subject to the constraint that
P
t+1
αβ (ai|ν, γ) = d.
In general it is desirable that observations should effect integrity estimates that are
semantically close. This is achieved by appealing to a semantic similarity function, δ,
such as that described in Footnote 4, if observation Ptαβ(ai|ν′, γ′) is made with strength
8 If the decay limit distribution is unknown we use a maximum entropy distribution.
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d′ then the posterior for Pt+1αβ (a|ν, γ) is the distribution with minimum relative entropy
to the prior Ptαβ(a|ν, γ) subject to the constraint that:
P
t+1
αβ (ai|ν, γ) =
bi × d′′
((1− bi)× (1 − d′′)) + (bi × d′′) , only if d
′′ > 0.5
where d′′ = d′× δ(ν, ν′)× δ(γ, γ′) discounts the effect of d′ using δ, and the condition
d′′ > 0.5 limits the update region to ν and γ that are semantically close to ν′ and γ′ —
this method assumes that the observations are independent. Then in the absence of new
observations Ptαβ(a|ν, γ) decays by Equation 3.
The estimate for Ptαβ(a|ν, γ) in the previous paragraph enables α to predict, or guess,
the appraisal that will be observed if α selects β to satisfy need ν in context γ. It may
be convenient to have a numeric score for β’s expected integrity given particular cir-
cumstances. One way to do this is to construct an ‘ideal’ distribution PtI(a|ν, γ) and to
define integrity as the relative entropy between this ideal distribution and the estimated
distribution:
G(α, β, ν, γ) = 1−
∑
a
P
t
I(a|ν, γ) log
P
t
I(a|ν, γ)
Ptαβ(a|ν, γ)
A simpler way is to used a metricated, totally ordered appraisal space and to define
integrity as expectation: G(α, β, ν, γ) =
∑
i ai × Ptαβ(ai|ν, γ).
5 Discussion
This paper addresses the problem of dealing with information asymmetry that includes
the observation that each agent knows more about its own commitments, and its in-
tended enactments, than any other agent. Further agents may, and often do, deliberately
conceal information to take strategic advantage. An agent can act in a perfectly trust-
worthy way, in the sense described above, whilst taking full advantage of the asymmetry
of its information: “Well I did precisely what you asked me to do”.
We have proposed two approaches to deal with information asymmetry. The first
builds on the observation that in complex situations human agents prefer to interact
with those with whom there is some depth of relationship to dealing with strangers. A
relationship model has been described that measures the amount of private information
that one agent knows about another, the reliability of that information and the balance in
their information exchanges. Calculating these models is not simple, but substantially
reuses those that update the agent’s world model, and so the marginal cost of building
the relationship model is small. The second approach models integrity that measures
overall satisfaction with an interaction; it is updated at the appraisal stage that may be a
considerable time after contract enactment.
Future work will focus on trialling the relationship model and the integrity model in
a simulated marketplace. There can be no guarantee that an agent will act with integrity
no matter how strong its relationships. So our goal will be to develop institutional in-
centives for agents to act with integrity based on published reputation measures, and
then to show that the models described in this paper may be used to protect against
unscrupulous exploitation of asymmetric information.
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